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Canadian military historians have argued that through the 
Canadian Corps’ flexibility and 
initiative, the Canadians had become 
the masters of trench raiding by 
1917.1 Raiding, so the argument goes, 
had a number of benefits. It gave 
the Canadian Corps an offensive 
esprit de corps, helped soldiers and 
junior officers escape the supposed 
monotony of trench warfare, seriously 
undermined German morale, and 
not the least, allowed the troops 
and Canadian headquarters to gain 
invaluable intelligence about enemy 
dispositions as well as familiarity 
with the terrain over which the Corps 
might soon be attacking.2 However, 
raiding was also seen to carry with 
it certain costs, and at times the 
Canadian Corps frankly debated its 
usefulness. As Tim Cook noted in 
Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the 
Great War, 1917-1918, while
Arthur Currie recognized the 
importance of raids in providing 
essential battle  skills for his troops, 
he also knew the casualties sustained 
in these missions were taking out 
his best men. When he raised his 
concerns with Byng, the senior corps 
commander chided him for being too 
cautious…3
When Currie was promoted to lead 
the Canadian Corps in June of 1917, 
he seemed to have at least temporarily 
cast aside his reservations about the 
cost of raiding, and during the next 
few months set an intensive raiding 
program for units. 
 A closer examination of the 
raiding program mounted by the 4th 
Division in the summer of 1917 shows 
that the operations undertaken, 
though successful in their own right, 
failed to generate many of these 
supposed benefits for the division’s 
main attack on Lens launched in mid-
August. In this instance, at least, it 
needs to be asked what was actually 
learned from the raids, and equally 
important, how was the information 
employed? This paper will argue 
that on the 4th Division front during 
July and August of 1917, even if 
individual attacks were successful, 
the overall benefit from raiding did 
not warrant the cost incurred.
 From early 1916 onward, trench 
raiding had become a routine practice 
for the Canadian Corps. It was further 
institutionalized in the winter of 
1916-1917 when British General 
Headquarters ordered every British 
and dominion division to carry out 
at least two raids per month.4 This 
may have been done for intra-allied 
political considerations, so that Field 
Marshal Douglas Haig, commander-
in-chief of the British Expeditionary 
Force (BEF), could point to the large 
number of BEF raids as a rebuttal if 
the hard-pressed French complained 
of British “inactivity.”5 That said, by 
the summer of 1917 not every division 
in the BEF took part in raiding 
operations. Notably, the Australian 
Imperial Force (AIF) had stopped 
mounting such attacks, having 
concluded that they generated little of 
military value. A company sergeant-
major of the Australian 14th Battalion 
tersely summed up the Australian 
position: “Raids are not worth the 
cost, none of the survivors want to 
go anymore.”6 The abandonment 
of raiding by an elite attacking 
formation like the AIF illustrates that 
not all BEF units viewed raiding as 
playing a significant role in achieving 
higher troop morale or gaining vital 
information about the Germans. 
 Nevertheless, senior officers of 
the Canadian Corps continued to 
give raiding a high priority during 
the summer of 1917, and this is 
essential context for the raids by 
4th Division in the Hill 70/Lens 
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sector. Very large raids 
organized at the corps 
level using multiple 
brigades and battalions 
w e r e  l a u n c h e d  i n 
May and June as part 
of the Scarpe battles. 
Carefully planned, with 
the officers and men 
training over taped 
courses, these were 
broadly successful in 
the judgment of G.W.L. 
Nicholson, the CEF’s 
official historian.7 One 
such  “ large”  ra id , 
executed around the 
same time period as 
the  4 th  Div is ion ’s 
many raids on the Lens 
front, was launched 
on  23  Ju ly  by  the 
3rd Division’s 116th 
Battalion. The objective 
for this battalion-sized 
raid was the railway 
embankment in the 
southern section of Lens. 
The raid successfully 
reached the railway 
embankment where 
vicious fighting broke 
out. The Canadians 
succeeded in blowing 
up a series of dugouts 
a n d  c a p t u r e d  5 3 
prisoners before pulling 
back after 35 minutes. For its efforts, 
the 116th suffered 74 casualties.8 
What useful information the raiders 
gleaned has not been looked at, 
however, as the 44th Battalion would 
discover a month later to the day, the 
formidable German defences around 
the railway embankment were still in 
place and undiminished. In practice, 
the Scarpe as well as the 116th 
Battalion operations constituted 
massive “one-off raids” – basically 
formal attacks followed by planned 
withdrawals. These were in sharp 
contrast to the more conventional 
“minor operations” (as the Canadian 
Corps referred to traditional-style 
raids) which were planned and 
executed at the brigade and battalion 
level and sustained day-in and day-
out, usually leading up to a major 
attack, the nature of the 4th Division 
operations that are the focus of the 
present study.
 B y  t h e  s u m m e r  o f  1 9 1 7 , 
Major-General David Watson had 
commanded the 4th Division through 
two major battles – the latter stages 
of the Somme and Vimy Ridge – as 
well as several lesser operations. The 
division and its commander fought 
capably in their first engagement, 
and also acquitted themselves rather 
well in the Vimy assault, considering 
they faced the most 
difficult conditions of 
any of the corps’ four 
divisions, and suffered 
the heaviest casualties. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e 
infamous raid on Hill 
145 mounted five weeks 
prior to Vimy, in which 
several of Watson’s 
battal ions were al l 
but annihilated, has 
raised questions among 
historians as to the 
battlefield judgement 
of  Watson and his 
GSO 1, Lieutenant-
C o l o n e l  W i l l i a m 
Ironside ,  in  1917 . 9 
Watson’s  meteor ic 
rise from battalion to 
divisional commander 
in a matter of months 
spoke of his political 
connections and savvy 
a s  m u c h  o r  m o r e 
than his operational 
p e r f o r m a n c e .  A n 
outward self-confidence 
seems to have masked 
insecurities, with the 
result  that  Watson 
could be susceptible 
to pressure from above 
to get “results.”10 For 
h i s  p a r t ,  I r o n s i d e 
was a brilliant young 
British staff officer, but arrogant and 
ambitious. Watson relied on the more 
experienced professional as a mentor, 
which was precisely the reason 
why Ironside had been seconded 
to the newly formed 4th Division 
in the spring of 1916. But there was 
evidence Watson, though a quick 
learner who was clearly maturing as 
a field commander, still relied on his 
GSO1 too much, and at the wrong 
times, particularly considering the 
degree to which Ironside’s ego and 
impetuosity could interfere with 
his own thinking. The result was 
that neither acted as a check on 
the other’s decision-making. Quite 
Li
br
ar
y 
an
d 
Ar
ch
iv
es
 C
an
ad
a 
(L
AC
) P
A 
4
2
5
4
Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie, commander of the Canadian Corps 
(left) and Major-General David Watson, commander of 4th Canadian 
Division, both supported trench raids.
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rightly, Watson saw his responsibility 
as carrying out higher orders – 
if ordered to raid by Currie, he 
would raid, and enthusiastically and 
unquestioningly. His command, the 
CEF’s most junior division, would 
not be found wanting in élan.11
 The 4th Division was blessed with 
capable brigadiers, all hand-picked by 
Watson. The British regular leading 
the 10th, Edward Hilliam, was made 
of stern Imperial stuff, a “fighter” but 
also a man whose relationship with 
his Canadian subordinates steadily 
deteriorated until he eventually had 
to be replaced. The commanders of 
the 11th and 12th Brigades – Victor 
Odlum and James MacBrien – were 
Canadians, the former an energetic 
prewar militia officer and the latter 
a regular with staff officer training 
and a more stolid personality. They 
were the only men to command their 
respective brigades in action during 
the war, leading them with distinction 
and much impressing Generals Byng 
and Currie in the process. As much 
or more than any other brigadier in 
the corps, Odlum was a disciple of 
raiding, having personally led many 
such operations during his time 
with the 7th Battalion, even while 
serving as its commanding officer. 
All three were personally loyal to 
Watson and respectful of Ironside’s 
undeniable talents. Overall, the 
working relationship among brigade 
and divisional headquarters was a 
smooth one.12 
 Collectively, the 12 infantry 
battalions making up the division 
were ably commanded by experienced 
officers, as the fighting during the 
remainder of the war would confirm. 
But all the units had suffered heavy 
combat losses earlier in the year, and 
were still integrating large numbers 
of junior officer, NCO and enlisted 
reinforcements into their ranks, a 
time-consuming process.13 
 Watson commanded in a collegial 
style, regularly seeking not only 
Ironside’s opinion in particular, but 
also the views of his brigadiers, at least 
when matters directly affected them. 
By predisposition, and sometimes 
still by necessity, Ironside exercised 
greater “command” responsibilities 
than were normally associated with 
his position, namely the organization 
and coordination and a significant 
role in the operational control of 
the division. In the raiding on the 
Lens front, Watson was responding 
to orders from corps headquarters, 
those generally emanating from 
Currie’s very capable chief of staff, 
Brigadier-General Percy Radcliffe. In 
consultation with Ironside, Watson 
Lieutenant-Colonel William Ironside was the GSO 1 (senior staff officer) of 4th Canadian Division in 1917. Ironside, a young British 
officer, was considered brilliant but arrogant and ambitious. His views held great sway as Major-General Watson relied on him as a 
mentor.
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would then issue directions to 
Hilliam, Odlum or MacBrien and 
their staffs to work out the specifics 
of the raids with the battalions tasked 
to carry them out, though the input 
from battalions seems to have been 
quite limited in practice throughout 
the corps. During July and the first 
three weeks of August, raids were 
dispatched into Lens from one or 
more of the 4th Division’s battalions 
in an apparent rotation (all battalions 
participated) about every three 
days. After the raids, the “results” 
were collected by the battalion, 
forwarded to brigade and then to 
divisional headquarters where the 
intelligence acquired from all the 
raids was collated, classified and 
summarized. This information was 
then placed at the disposal of the 
divisional commander as well as the 
corps commander and his staff.14
 Tim Cook has argued that 
within the Canadian Corps raiding 
became a very competitive activity. 
This growing competitiveness had 
detrimental effects, as both the plans 
and operations were rushed.15 While 
this may have been the general case 
for the Canadian Corps, during the 
summer of 1917 the 4th Division 
had a clear purpose in the upcoming 
operation at Lens, and had plenty of 
time to organize and carry out raids. 
The raids examined here were not just 
thrown together to showcase specific 
units’ skills or to keep the men in an 
aggressive frame of mind. 
 Foremost among the arguments 
for the usefulness of raiding put 
forward by the Canadian Corps was 
the acquisition of practical knowledge 
of the enemy-held territory over 
which the troops would advance 
during a main assault.16 This holds 
some truth, though through the 
diligent employment of existing 
maps, trench observation posts, and 
aerial reconnaissance the terrain 
was generally very well known. 
Nevertheless, it was still argued 
that the raiding troops would gain a 
better insight into the details of the 
Germans’ trenches and gun positions. 
Raiding the forward German lines in 
front of Lens during July and August 
1917 was done during both the hours 
of daylight and darkness.17 At night, 
with limited visibility, learning the 
lay of the land and the details of 
German defences would have been 
extremely difficult. During the day, 
the raiders also would have faced 
the obvious problem that attacking 
in broad daylight would bring – 
their own exposure – although they 
could at least clearly see the terrain 
they were crossing. No records from 
these so-called “minor operations” 
– the Canadian Corps’ euphemism 
for raiding – demonstrate that the 
4th Division’s raiders brought back 
any information of such importance 
that it warranted a change in overall 
plans, such as altering the axis 
of the main attack on Lens. The 
tactical realities of Lens and the 
infamous Green Crassier position 
dictated the direction of the attacks 
decided at brigade and divisional 
level, regardless of any information 
brought back by raiders.
 At Lens, most tellingly, any 
information the raiders may have 
gained to familiarize the troops with 
the ground and enemy dispositions 
simply did not pay off. Almost 
immediately after the 4th Division 
launched its attack on 21 August 
there was confusion as to where to 
go, and the withering fire from the 
German defenders fighting from 
hidden pillboxes that raiding (and 
all other intelligence gathering for 
that matter) had failed to locate 
began to decimate the attackers.18 
The 50th Battalion’s effort to push 
into the ruins of the city was typical 
of the intelligence failure on the 
Lens front. The intelligence reports 
used by Lieutenant-Colonel Lionel 
Major-General Watson was fortunate to have three capable brigadiers – Edward Hilliam of 10th Brigade (left), Victor Odlum of 11th 
Brigade (centre) and James MacBrien of 12th Brigade. These men were the only commanders of their respective brigades during 
the war and earned the respect of Watson, Byng and Currie.
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Page, commanding officer of the 50th 
Battalion, stated that the German 
front (Aloof Trench) was weakly 
held.19 Unfortunately for Page and 
his men, these reports were wrong 
and the 50th battalion ran into heavy 
German resistance. In the words 
of one signaller: “[The Germans] 
launched a powerful attack against 
our decimated ranks with such 
ferocity that [their] onslaught drove 
us back to our original position.”20 
Another serious intelligence failure 
that occurred despite the extensive 
raiding and patrolling in Lens 
contributed to the selection of the 
wrong route for the 44th Battalion’s 
attack on the Green Crassier two 
days later. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Reginald Davies had decided, based 
on supposedly sound raiding and 
scouting intelligence, that the chosen 
route to the Green Crassier was only 
lightly defended.21 Just the opposite 
was true. As the Canadians made 
their way to the Green Crassier, 
the route was defended by tunnels 
and hidden German pill boxes that 
had been built into the rubble of 
Lens. Hard fighting ensued and the 
Canadians were forced to fall back. 
The 44th Battalion suffered 260 
casualties in its assault on the Green 
Crassier.22 These were far from the 
only examples of the vital questions 
that intelligence from raiding was 
supposed to answer, but had not. 
In summary, the raids mounted 
around Lens in the summer of 1917 
did not gain information that helped 
Canadian commanders and staff 
officers understand how best to 
navigate the terrain in major assaults 
or how the enemy was deployed.
* * * * *
Another often hailed benefit of raiding was the acquisition of 
information, usually from prisoners, 
about enemy units, and in particular 
their strength, morale, and combat 
readiness. Yet how useful was this 
information? Through raiding and 
other forms of intelligence gathering, 
the 4th Canadian Division believed 
they had identified the German units 
facing them, the 8th and 11th Reserve 
Divisions. Major-General Watson 
and his staff viewed the former as 
having very high fighting ability 
and morale, in contrast to the latter 
which they categorized as average.23 
Despite this assessment Watson and 
his staff did not alter their attack 
plan to take advantage of the sector 
held by the less effective division. 
In any case, the raiding and other 
forms of intelligence gathering were 
only partially right, as the German 
force opposing them in the Lens 
area actually consisted solely of the 
supposedly weaker 11th Reserve 
Division.24
 It has also been argued that 
one of the main goals of raiding 
was to keep the Germans “taut and 
nervous”25 and that it “forced them 
to abandon their forward posts and 
patrolling, and limited their ability 
to detect attacks which was being 
prepared against them…keeping 
German morale low.”26 On the 
Lens front, however, the Germans, 
despite extensive Canadian raiding, 
were thoroughly prepared when 
the Canadian Corps launched its 
attack, with their forward positions 
fully manned and their artillery 
accurately registered on the Canadian 
start line. The assault companies of 
the 50th Battalion had to endure a 
savage German bombardment for 
25 minutes before even commencing 
their attack.27 The Canadians then 
met stiff resistance from the forward-
most German posts whose machine 
guns had bloody effect. Overall, 
out of five Canadian battalions that 
attacked on 21 August, only two 
reached their planned objectives – the 
German front lines – after a full day 
of fighting, and the other three had to 
return to their jumping off points.28 
Though the claim that raiding was 
effective at lowering the German 
frontline troops’ morale is impossible 
to measure, it was irrelevant in 
the Lens case. The 11th Reserve 
Division had been replaced by the 
elite 1st Guards Reserve Division 
on 20 August, a development the 
Canadians were unaware of until 
their attack commenced less than 24 
hours later.29
 Another benefit claimed for 
raiding was that it stopped the 
Germans from sending out their own 
raids and reconnaissance patrols, 
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and thus helped to mask Canadian 
activities. However, historian Bill 
Rawling, who argues that raiding 
was aggressively pursued by both 
sides over the course of the war, states 
that: “[German] raids continued even 
as the Canadians became more active 
in trying to gain information for 
upcoming offensives.”30 This held 
true on the 4th Division’s front during 
the summer of 1917. Even with the 
Canadian artillery pummelling the 
German front lines, and the division 
carrying out a very aggressive raiding 
program, the Germans were still 
actively patrolling no-man’s-land 
as confirmed by the 38th Battalion 
war diary.31 Raiding was supposed 
to gather vital information, and the 
German dugouts often contained 
maps and other documents that 
in Canadian hands would help 
the corps plan its assaults more 
effectively. Raiders were also under 
orders to bring back prisoners who 
could be interrogated on everything 
from issues bearing on the upcoming 
battle to how the German home front 
was coping with the demands of the 
war.32 A raid by the 75th Battalion 
illustrated the importance placed on 
capturing prisoners. As the war diary 
recorded matter-of-factly:
A raid on the front line was carried 
out by the platoons under Lieuts. 
Brunton and Bradfield on the 
morning of the 9th. The object of 
this raid was to secure a prisoner 
for identification purposes [and] the 
raiders brought back two…33 
Though the diary mentions that the 
battalion suffered casualties, it does 
not say how many. The purpose of 
the raid was to gain information from 
prisoners, information which had 
already been acquired from earlier 
raids, and which was unlikely to 
alter the plans one way or another 
during the final days before the 
main assault. In the lead up to the 
Lens attack, the raiders did acquire 
German documents and maps, but 
these did not change the plans that 
had been laid out in mid-July – before 
the raiding had even commenced.
* * * * *
It was argued during the war – and continues to be argued – that 
raids were justified for enhancing 
the attacking soldiers’ élan and thus 
strengthening the Canadian Corps’ 
battlefield prowess. Senior officers 
thought that junior officers and other 
ranks would become bored and 
restless with the monotony of trench 
life, and raiding was something 
that would break this up.34 Raiding 
demanded a lot of initiative, fitness, 
and bravery as the raiders had to enter 
the enemy’s lines, either sabotage 
German trenches or grab something of 
importance for Canadian intelligence, 
and flee before the enemy had time to 
respond. On 28 July the 87th Battalion 
carried out a raid against the 11th 
Reserve Division for identification 
purposes. After a sharp skirmish, 
in which three Canadians were 
killed and four wounded, the patrol 
returned with neither useful German 
documents nor prisoners.35 One is 
hard pressed to see how this raid 
could have raised the confidence of 
the men in the 87th Battalion. With 
an approaching large scale offensive, 
moreover, the “monotony of trench 
life” should not have set in on this 
front, as the troops had only been 
moved into their positions in mid-
July.36 Instead of sending a constant 
stream of raids into the German lines, 
these soldiers, a great many of them 
replacements for the division’s heavy 
losses at Vimy Ridge, would surely 
have benefited more by focusing on 
preparations for the main assault. 
 The number of troops assigned to 
a particular raid during the summer 
of 1917 varied, usually from eight 
to 30 men. In what was typical 
for the organization of small raids 
at the time, on 29 July the 54th 
Battalion sent out a party comprising 
one non-commissioned officer, two 
riflemen, two rifle grenadiers and 
three bombers.37 A larger raid would 
have committed a force of about 
30 men led by a lieutenant but 
Canadian soldiers examine concrete German gun positions in the destroyed suburbs of Lens following the battle.
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otherwise would have 
been made up of similar 
proportions of NCOs, 
bombers, grenadiers 
and riflemen. In August, 
when the attack on Hill 
70 was approaching, the 
raiding parties of the 4th 
Division progressively 
grew in the attempt to 
confuse the Germans 
as to where the corps’ 
main thrust would fall. 
The 87th Battalion, for 
instance, launched a 
company sized raid on 
12 August.38 
 Some raids might 
suffer no casualties at 
all, such as one on 12 
August by the 38th 
Battalion, though this was a rarity.39 
Examination of the war diaries of 
the battalions of the 4th Division 
confirms that the raiding parties 
usually suffered five or six casualties, 
though there are instances of much 
heavier losses. An 87th Battalion 
raid on 1 August miscarried when 
the Germans became aware of its 
presence and dropped gas shells 
on top of the men, inflicting eleven 
casualties.40 In another instance, from 
the 102nd Battalion’s war diary: “a 
raiding party proceed[ed] up the road 
…the crater was entered and their 
[sic] in successfully bombed, but the 
lip of the crater facing the wrong way 
we had no cover and were compelled 
by heavy machine gun and rifle fire to 
withdraw.”41 The casualties suffered 
were four other ranks killed and 
seven wounded.42
 During July  and the  f i rs t 
three weeks of August, raids were 
dispatched into Lens by one or more 
of the 4th Division’s 12 infantry 
Battalions about every three days. 
One private boasted before the attack 
that “we even know the names of 
the streets we are to march up and 
the actual houses we are to mop up” 
but the troops were mistaken in their 
belief they had a good feel for the lay 
of the land.43 Soldiers sent to scout the 
route that the 44th Battalion would 
take into Lens and up the Green 
Crassier reported back that the route 
was relatively clear of Germans.44 
Four days later, when the 44th 
Battalion attacked on this “relatively 
clear route,” it turned out that the 
scouts had been wrong. Allen Hart, 
a private in the battalion, recounted 
after the war how unprepared they 
were for the attack into Lens and up 
the Green Crassier – “Well of course 
everything was anything but lovely 
because these boys got over there 
and it was – it was no small show, it 
was a big show, and it hadn’t been 
realized how big an undertaking 
it was…”45 The 44th Battalion was 
involved in vicious street fighting 
where they suffered 260 casualties.46 
The disastrous attacks into Lens 
and against the Green Crassier 
demonstrated that the intelligence 
from all sources, including raiding, 
was a failure, and that many enemy 
strong points had in fact not been 
located.
* * * * *
Historians have argued that “by raiding and patrolling, 
the Canadians experimented with 
new battle theories and 
tactics [and that] it was 
the trench patrol and 
raid that became the 
laboratory of battle.”47 
Perhaps this was true on 
quiet fronts in the long 
months between major 
operations. It stretches 
credibility, however, 
that while preparing 
f o r  a n  i m m i n e n t 
assault  by three of 
the corps’ divisions 
there would be tactical 
e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n . 4 8 
None of the war diaries, 
operat ional  orders , 
o r  d i rec t ives  f rom 
battalion, brigade, and 
divisional commands 
mention anything about raiding being 
intended to generate new tactics or 
ideas that would be employed in 
the assault on Lens. Rather the 
documentation exclusively concerns 
intelligence gathering.49 
 In the summer of 1917, intelligence 
gained from a number of different 
sources made the information 
raiders brought back less significant. 
Gathering information on the enemy’s 
forward defences came from a wide 
range of sources including existing 
maps, aerial observation, interviews 
with local citizens, diligent forward 
observers, the experiences of BEF 
units previously engaged in the 
same sector, “quiet” patrolling, the 
interception of German wireless 
messages, in addition to raiding.50 
Confirmation, for example, that 
the preparatory shelling severely 
disrupted the Germans’ front line 
defences came from intercepted 
wireless communications: “the British 
[sic] by destructive fire lasting for 
four weeks have turned the foremost 
German positions into a shell hole 
area like Flanders.”51 Of course, 
these results had also been picked 
up by aerial photography. Raiding 
confirmed such reports, at the cost of 
unnecessary casualties, and seemed 
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A German bunker near Lens, photographed in September 1917.
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like a high risk activity compared 
to other more passive intelligence-
gathering methods. 
 Most historians agree that raiding 
was an inherently limited activity, 
in the sense that raids could not 
penetrate very far into enemy lines, 
usually only reaching the Germans’ 
first line of defence. In an area 
such as Lens, the pulverized ruins 
of a small city, it was especially 
difficult for raiding troops to find 
their way. Getting useful information 
from beyond the front lines by 
raiding alone would have been very 
challenging. At best, the information 
gathered from raids could only been 
of limited use, since the 4th Division’s 
assault was planned to press much 
farther into Lens than raiders had 
been able to reconnoitre.
 The 4th Division’s raids may have 
been more effective in contributing to 
the formation’s mission to deceive 
the German defenders into believing 
that the primary assault would be on 
Lens rather than Hill 70, where the 
1st and 2nd Divisions were in fact to 
make main effort a few days before 
the 4th Division’s attack on Lens. 
Fourth Division strived mightily to 
attract the enemy’s attention to Lens, 
placing dummy tanks in the sector 
facing the town, subjecting the town 
to heavier artillery shelling than 
Hill 70, and sending more raids into 
Lens than the surrounding areas.52 
As many historians have argued, 
artillery played a crucial role in the 
Canadian Corps’ success throughout 
the Great War. Hill 70 and Lens 
were no different.53 In interviews 
conducted after the attack, German 
prisoners often mentioned how 
fierce the machine gun barrage or 
artillery bombardments had been, 
but were silent on the raiding.54 As 
Major-General Edward Morrison, 
commander of the Canadian Corps 
field artillery, subsequently wrote 
of the role his guns had played in 
convincing the Germans that the 
main attack was Lens: “to our great 
satisfaction the enemy put down 
a tremendous barrage in front of 
Lens and Avion…He was entirely 
outmanoeuvred...and by the time 
the Germans realized their mistake 
the attacking troops [at Hill 70] 
were in their final objective.”55 The 
raids could only have confirmed the 
Germans in their misapprehension 
that the main attack would be against 
Lens, but the after-action interviews 
leave little doubt that the artillery 
bombardment was the key to the 
successful deception.56
 Certainly the Lens sector was a 
unique situation for raiding in the 
Aerial photographs, such as this composite image of the northern half of Lens taken on 9 August 1917, provided 
a great deal of essential intelligence for the Canadian Corps.
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Canadian Corps’ history. The 4th 
Division’s attack into the town on 
21-24 August demonstrated that 
fighting in the ruins of a built-up 
area posed daunting challenges, and 
underscored the unique difficulties 
that the raiding program in that 
same area had encountered.57 Yet, the 
raids carried out in July and August 
were viewed as being successful, 
and not just by the 4th Division’s 
own commanders. The participating 
soldiers did not report difficulties 
different from those encountered in 
raids carried out over other types of 
ground. They were confident about 
the intelligence gleaned from their 
prisoners and the other information 
they brought back from their forays 
into German lines. A 12th Infantry 
Brigade report that “daylight raids 
were [sent] out from 72nd Bn., 
and gained valuable information 
as to the enemy defences and his 
method of holding the line opposite 
our front” was typical of opinion 
on the utility of the raids.58 This 
confidence demonstrates that the 
raids were working as the Canadians 
intended. The disappointing results 
of the 4th Division’s main attacks 
starkly illustrate that the “valuable 
information” the 12th Brigade had 
received was an illusion.
 One reason why the raiding might 
have been ineffective on the Lens 
front is that the information gathered 
may have been misinterpreted. 
Though the war diaries and after-
battle reports do not mention the 
underlying purpose of these raids, 
documents at the divisional and 
corps level confirm that it was 
thought success at Hill 70 would 
rely to a significant degree on the 
4th Division misleading the Germans 
into believing that the main thrust 
of the coming Canadian attack was 
going to be directed at Lens.59 Perhaps 
the meaning of the intelligence 
gathered on other issues (such as 
how well defended Lens was, how 
booby-trapped the rubble and how 
disorienting navigating through the 
town would be for the attackers) was 
ignored in pursuit of the overarching 
goal for the raids: trying to confuse 
the Germans about where the main 
thrust of the Canadian Corps’ assault 
would fall. Concerned that the 4th 
Division’s feinting role succeed, corps 
headquarters may have been focusing 
on certain questions about Lens and 
misinterpreting, downplaying or 
even ignoring other information that 
had been gathered which would have 
been important for the second phase 
of operations, the attack on Lens 
itself. 
 By 1917, raiding was an activity 
most of the BEF engaged in religiously 
– only the Australians considered 
raiding ineffective. Analyzing the 
multitude of raids carried out in 
the summer of 1917 in front of Lens 
shows that for the most part the 
actual operations were successfully 
carried out.60 In sum, however, 
most of the intelligence gained 
through raiding was either of little 
importance, redundant or obtainable 
by alternative means. In some cases 
it was actually misleading, causing 
overconfidence among the attackers 
when the main assault went in. As for 
disrupting the Germans, one is forced 
to conclude that the raiding program 
had no great effect. 
 This paper solely analyzes a six-
week raiding campaign carried out 
by the 4th Division of the Canadian 
Corps at Lens in 1917. To establish if 
these conclusions have validity over 
a longer period – in other words, 
that raiding did not serve as vital 
a role in the CEF as much of the 
historical wisdom asserts, and that 
there would have been few adverse 
effects on the corps’ operational 
effectiveness if it had been reduced 
or perhaps even eliminated – would 
require a far more extensive study 
of raiding operations. What is clear, 
however, is that the paradigm that 
raiding was a worthwhile activity 
must be questioned, as Canadian 
military historians have recently 
begun to do. Yet arguments that 
there was a cult of competitiveness 
in the Canadian Corps and that raids 
lost their effectiveness because of 
increasingly reckless behaviour do 
not seem relevant in this particular 
study. The 4th Division raids were 
carefully planned and carried out 
with specific goals in mind over a 
period of weeks. They were viewed 
as successful, and the information 
garnered from the raiders was used – 
it just happened to have had very little 
of value. It is worth noting that in the 
summer of 1918, the Canadian Corps 
did not partake in raiding leading up 
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to one of its most successful attacks, 
the battle of Amiens. Instead, it was 
felt that the element of surprise 
would bring much more benefit 
for the attacking Canadians than 
any information raiding would 
have gleaned about, or the chaos it 
would have sewn in, the enemy’s 
forward defences. The extensive 
employment of raiding in the Lens 
sector proved of marginal use and 
the resources and effort expended 
could have been channelled into 
different preparations which would 
have been more beneficial to the Lens 
operation’s success. Perhaps in the 
end the raids of the 4th Division in 
the summer of 1917 did not matter.
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